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20 SEP 1965

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

copy 4 of 6

SUBJECT : Letter for Dr. Lawrence A. Hyland,
Chairman, Strategic Weapons Intelligence Panel

The attached letter to Dr. Hyland, Chairman, Strategic Weapons Intelligence Panel clarifies a number of issues raised during the recent Panel meeting. The letter also mentions action you have taken on some of their recommendations and requests a written report for each future meeting.

It is recommended that the attached letter be signed.

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ALBERT D. WHEELON
Deputy Director
for
Science and Technology

Attachment
Letter to Dr. Hyland

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copy 6 of 8

20 SEP 1969

Dr. Lawrence A. Hyland
Vice President and General Manager
Hughes Aircraft Company
Culver City, California

Dear Dr. Hyland:

I want to express again my appreciation for the fine report from you and the members of the Strategic Weapons Intelligence Panel. I consider it most important that we continue to get the views of highly competent people on the many vital intelligence problems which you discussed in your last meeting. I am following up on the many points raised by the Panel and thought you might be interested in a few of the specifics.

The new AN-22 aircraft recently displayed in Paris was mentioned by several Panel members and there were questions as to our prior knowledge of its development. Attached is a review of the intelligence record concerning the AN-22. In response to your suggestion during the USIB meeting, there is a chronology showing the dates of various written reports and the estimates made relative to this aircraft.

In regard to the requirement for improving the collection and analysis of information pertaining to Soviet Naval Forces and their ASW program, I fully agree that we do indeed need improvement. It appears that one of our problems may be the fact that the analysis effort tends to be divided with the Navy working primarily in the area of Soviet Naval operations while CIA has tended to concentrate more on basic Soviet capability

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data. I am looking into the possibility of some realignment in this area but as you would appreciate, this is not a simple matter when such sensitive programs are involved.

Several of the Panel members commented on the need for a more careful look at U. S. planned programs and current capabilities as an aid in assessing Soviet information. Again, I am in general agreement with the thoughts expressed and I am taking steps to change the situation. CIA does not receive the SIOP nor do we necessarily receive all of the many research and development proposals generated within the military departments. I think our liaison is reasonably good but I plan an annual briefing by each of the three services on their R&D programs so that we may keep reasonably informed. We look to people such as those on your Panel to help fill this gap.

The several comments made about the importance of projecting our estimates well beyond the solid intelligence data base suggests that more time should probably be devoted to discussions of this subject in future Panel sessions. I intend to have Sherman Kent join you during your next meeting to give you some details regarding our estimative procedures and techniques.

I was not surprised that all of the Panel seemed concerned about a Soviet anti-satellite capability. I, too, am very much concerned and have been taking advantage of every opportunity to raise this subject with our policy makers. As part of these discussions I have emphasized that we may be entering a period when policy changes will tend to shift the emphasis to military space programs rather than those aimed at peaceful space exploration. Such a policy change naturally makes the anti-satellite question an even more important one.

As to our present satellite photographic capability, the Panel stressed the possibility that there may be a number of unknown missile sites in areas which are usually cloud covered

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and possibly quite remote from the Soviet rail nets. I am also well aware of this possibility but as I hope our briefers pointed out, we do have an extensive photography search program going on all the time. Although we probably can't do much about the cloud cover problem, improvements in our photographic capability will significantly reduce the possibility that the Russians are hiding sensitive military installations. I intend to keep the Panel members informed as to the progress we are making in this area.



The suggestion that we provide a better feedback mechanism in our estimates is a good one. I have already undertaken a review of just how good our estimates were over the past several years and will be happy to give you a report of this analysis at a future meeting.

One additional technical matter of interest was the question as to the availability of a suitable warhead for the Soviet small ICBM program. I agree that there is no obvious candidate in the nuclear test program and it is not clear that they could have developed entirely new weapons in the rather limited underground program since the treaty was signed. I have asked that this subject be re-examined in an attempt to clear up what appears to be a real anomaly.

I hope some of these points will be of value in looking to future meetings. I intend to make full use of the ideas and

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TOP SECRET

suggestions brought out in your verbal report. In this connection, I think it would be most helpful if you could prepare a brief written report for each future meeting, although I fully appreciate the difficulty of doing so.

Kindest personal regards.

Sincerely,

Signed

W. F. Raborn
Director

Attachment

[Redacted]

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